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Defective Automobiles and the U.C.C.
William T. Stanley, Jr.*
T HE AUTOMOBILE WARRANTY DISCLAIMER today is the subject of much
controversy and abuse, often with good reason. The automobile pur-
chaser has long suffered from being on the sticky end of a contract of
adhesion. Those who own automobiles have all too often had unpleasant
experiences with patent flaws, latent defects and shoddy repairs. But
sympathy is generally coming to lie with the "aggrieved" buyer, and the
warranty disclaimer is now under siege.1 As these express disclaimers
are increasingly invalidated by the courts, a familiarity with the implied
warranties of merchantability2 and fitness for purpose,3 and a working
knowledge of remedies (for buyer and seller) become imperative.
Two interrelated topics will be covered in this discussion: warranty
disclaimers under Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors4 and under the Uni-
form Commercial Code (hereinafter referred to as "Code"); and rejec-
tion, revocation, and cure under the Code. Zabriskie Chevrolet v.
Smith5 will also be examined, for this particular case contains one of the
few opinions which actually attempts6 to fully apply the Code and its
remedies to a warranty disclaimer situation.
* B.A., Washington and Lee Univ.; General Manager of Burring Production Co.,
Cleveland, Ohio; Fourth-year student at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleve-
land State Univ.
1 In a news release of March 19, 1969 the Federal. Trade Commission made public
its Proposed Guides for Advertising Over-The-Counter Drugs (i.e., non-prescription
drugs). Buried deep in the proposed Act is the following:
Guide 12(e). An express "guarantee" or "warranty" should not contain limita-
tions, disclaimers or provisos which purport to deprive members
of the public of any rights which they would have in the absence
of such express provisions.
This may be the beginning of a significant trend. At least it signals the direction
that the F.T.C. may be planning to take, and this in itself is important.
Also see Federal Trade Commission Staff Report on Automobile Warranties (un-
dated report presumably published between 1966 and 1969, available through United
States Congressman), which was conducted and prepared by the Bureau of Decep-
tive Practices and Bureau of Economics. In this report are actual case histories of
warranty problems, statistics concerning all phases of vehicle reliability and warranty
application, advertising, practices, etc.
2 U.C.C. Sec. 2-314: (1) Unless excluded or modified (Sec. 2-316), a warranty that
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of that kind.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as . . . are fit for the ordi-
nary purposes for which such goods are used.
3 U.C.C. Sec. 2-315: Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know
any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is
relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is
unless excluded or modified . . . an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for
such purpose.
4 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (Supr. Ct. 1960).
5 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968).
6 Here, although the operation of applying the Code was successful, the patient
died. This author feels that a wrong decision was reached.
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1969
18 CLEV. ST. L. R. (3)
In the Zabriskie case, the defendant, Smith, signed a form purchase
order for a new Chevrolet automobile which was to be sold to him by
Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. This automobile was "represented to the de-
fendant to be a brand-new car that would operate perfectly." 7 Eight
days later, the defendant's wife took delivery of the automobile and was
at that time presented with the manufacturer-dealer warranty, which
contained a disclaimer clause of which neither she nor the defendant was
aware.
The car was driven .7 miles when a small valve in the transmission
failed, making the car virtually inoperable. The plaintiff had the car
towed to its (the plaintiff's) repair shop and cured the defect by re-
placing the entire transmission.'
The defendant refused to take delivery of the repaired car and
asserted a cancellation of the sale.9 Plaintiff then brought suit for the
purchase price, and the defendant ultimately prevailed in the ensuing
litigation.
Warranty Disclaimers
In Zabriskie, the warranty disclaimer was in fine print, number nine
of eleven clauses, on the back of the sales contract signed by the buyer:
There are no warranties, express or implied, on Chevrolet motor
vehicles sold by Dealer except the New Vehicle Warranty whichDealer, as seller, and not as agent of the manufacturer, gives to Pur-
chaser on each new Chevrolet motor vehicle sold by the Dealer.
The court disqualified this disclaimer under Code Section 2-316(2),
which reads:
Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied war-
ranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must men-
tion merchantability and in case of writing must be conspicuous, andto exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion
must be by a writing and conspicuous . . . language . . . is sufficientif it states, for example, that "There are no warranties which extendbeyond the description on the face hereof." (Emphasis added.) 10
7 Zabriskie Chevrolet v. Smith, supra note 5, 240 A.2d, at 197, 200.
8 The new transmission inserted into the automobile was removed from anotherbrand-new similar vehicle in the plaintiff's showroom. The transmission was factory
new and had never been used. This was a fact uncontroverted by the defendant.The precise reason for substitution of a whole new unit rather than replacement
was never made clear. However, quaere: would not this factory built, new trans-
mission be even a better form of cure than a dealer rebuilt unit (the original with
a new valve)?
9 The buyer also stopped payment on the purchase money check.
10 For the text of the referenced U.C.C. Sec. 2-316(3) (b), see supra note 38.The referenced U.C.C. Sec. 2-316(3) (c) states, "An implied warranty can alsobe excluded or modified by course of dealing or course of performance or usage of
trade."
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Certainly the fine print on the back of the sales order could not be con-
strued as "conspicuous," 11 and many cases support this view of the
court.1 2 The language of the disclaimer was not challenged by the court,
although other jurisdictions have held that a valid disclaimer of the im-
plied warranties of fitness or merchantability must plainly state that
there is no warranty that the product is reasonably suited for use as an
automobile.
13
The facts of the Zabriskie case show that the defendant did not re-
ceive the "New Car Warranty" booklet, which contained the specific
disclaimers, until eight days after signing the sales order form. Pre-
suming that the disclaimer on the sales order form failed, any reference
contained in it alluding to the "New Car Warranty" would also fail. The
"New Car Warranty" and its disclaimers must be invalid under basic
contract principles since additional consideration is lacking to support
such a subsequently received warranty. 14
These disclaimers were disqualified for technical reasons, and many
courts have employed this refuge to escape having to determine uncon-
scionableness. The Zabriskie court went still further to discuss the lack
of enforceability of the disclaimers before it, even if all the requirements
of Code Section 2-316 (2) had been met. 15 The buyer was held to be left
11 U.C.C. Sec. 1-201(10) defines "conspicuous" as being "so written that a reasonable
person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. A printed heading in
capitals (as: NON-NEGOTIABLE BILL OF LADING) is conspicuous, (or) . . . if
it is in larger or other contrasting type or color."
12 See Dailey v. Holiday Distributing Corp., 151 N.W. 2d 477 (Iowa Supr. Ct., 1967),
where a fine print limitation on warranty found upon the reverse side of a contract
was branded by the court as "evasive concealment." See also Minikes v. Admiral
Corp., 48 Misc. 2d 1012, 266 N.Y.S. 2d 461 (Supr. Ct. 1966), in which a disclaimer,
although on the front of an order, was smaller in type size than the rest of the
order printing and was construed to be not conspicuous. See also S.F.C. Acceptance
Corp. v. Ferree, 39 Pa. D. & C. 2d 225; 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 808 (Ct. of Common
Pleas, 1966), and Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley, 329 F. 2d 585 (8 Cir. 1964),
where the disclaimer was on the front of the contract in the same size type and
color of printing as the main body, but was held to not be conspicuous. The U.C.C.
was applicable here as provided by contract.
'3 See Willman v. American Motor Sales Co., 44 Erie Co. C.U. 51, 1 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 100 (Ct. of Common Pleas 1961). See also Boshkoff, Some Thoughts About
Physical Harm, Disclaimers and Warranties, 4 B.C. Ind. & Comm. L.R. 285 (1963),
which applies the same philosophy to Henningsen (pre-Code): "The disclaimer in
Henningsen should be considered invalid, not because it was imposed upon a small
buyer by a big seller, but because it did not tell the consumer that he might expect
his car to fail within a month of purchase."
14 In Zabriskie, supra note 5, the Court cites Diepeveen v. Larry Vogt, Inc., 27 N.J.
Super. 254, 99 A.2d 329 (App. Div. 1953), in which title to flower bulbs was found
to have passed to the buyer previous to the effectiveness of the disclaimer, due to
a "standing order." Mack Trucks of Arkansas, Inc. v. Jet Asphalt & Rock Co., 246
Ark. Sco. 99; 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 93 (1969), and Marion Power Shovel Co. v. Hunts-
man, 246 Ark. Sco. 149, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 100 (1969) are two cases decided under
the Uniform Commercial Code which hold that delivery of a disclaimer after a
contract is made negates the disclaimer.
15 U.C.C. Sec. 2-316(2) states that "Language to exclude all implied warranties of
fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that 'There are no warranties which
(Continued on next page)
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in the possible position of having "to accept the vehicle, even if it did
not operate," and the court reasoned that "this was obviously not the
buyer's intention." 16 Reliance was placed upon Code Section 2-719
which provides for contractual modification or limitation of remedy:
(1) (a). The agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or
in substitution for those provided in this article and may limit or
alter the measure of damages recoverable under this Article, as by
limiting the buyer's remedies to . . .repair and replacement of non-
conforming goods or parts.
(1) (b). The contractual remedy may be expressly agreed to be ex-
clusive and then it will be the sole remedy.
Such is the case under our hypothetically code-perfect disclaimer. But
Code Section 2-719 (1), (a) and (b) are subject to Code Section 2-719
(2):
Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail
of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act.
The Official Comment to 2-719 calls for "at least adequate remedies" to
be available, "thus any clause purporting to modify or limit the remedial
provisions of this Article in an unconscionable manner is subject to de-
letion and in that event the remedies made available by this Article are
applicable as if the stricken clause had never existed." (Emphasis
added.) Cross reference is made in the Official Comments to Code Sec-
tion 2-302 which gives the court almost plenary power to modify an un-
conscionable (as defined by the court) contract. 1 7 The Official Comment
to Code Section 2-302 says that "the principle is one of the prevention
of oppression and unfair surprise . .. and not of disturbance of allocation
of risks because of superior bargaining power" (emphasis added) .1 A
(Continued from preceding page)
extend beyond the description on the face hereof.'" Contrast this with Willman v.
American Motor Sales Co., supra note 13. But, theoretically, the requirements of
2-316 could be met even if brightly colored ink, large type, and Willman court
language were necessary.
16 Zabriskie Chevrolet v. Smith, supra note 5 at 290 A.2d 197. But, quaere: in this
situation wasn't the buyer given contractual protection as to repairs and replace-
ment parts in the warranty? Would it be unconscionable for the buyer to have to
accept an inoperative vehicle if the seller had to cure perfectly within a reasonable
time? And is it practically possible or even feasible for any mass -manufacturer to
produce complicated mechanical goods with "factory new parts which (will) operate
perfectly as represented"? It would seem from the tenor of the language in the
Zabriskie decision that no substitution of parts by the dealer will be allowed.
17 An excellent short explanation of the application of Uniform Commercial Code
Section 2-302 is found in note, Bargaining Power and Unconscionability: A sug-
gested approach to U.C.C. Section 2-302, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 998 (1966). For a more
detailed account of history and application, see note, Unconscionable Contracts:
The Uniform Commercial Code, 45 Iowa L. Rev. 843 (1960).
18 Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F. 2d 80 (3 Cir. 1948), cited by the Official Com-
ment to Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-302, involved an agreement for the
purchase of carrots. The court refused to enforce the contract against the defend-
ant grower, possibly because he was oppressed in a rising market, but ostensibly
(Continued on next page)
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number of cases are cited by the authors of the Official Comment to Code
Section 2-302 to supplement their explanation of Code Section 2-302.19
The leading cases decided on the basis of unconscionability all have
one major common characteristic. Someone has suffered an unconscion-
able loss with no adequate remedy at law, and the court makes the loser
whole through various equitable remedies.
But is the warranty disclaimer in the Zabriskie case unconscionable
as to the buyer's remedies in this particular situation? The court refers
to Henningsen, certainly a leading case of historic proportions, although
pre-Code. In Henningsen, a buyer of a new car drove it 400 miles when
it unaccountably went out of control and was totally wrecked. Due to
the pulverized condition of the machine, the buyer was unable to make
a case of negligence, prima facie. So, he sued the automobile dealer on
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, despite the standard
disclaimer limiting the buyer's remedy to replacement or repair of de-
fective parts. If the court had not equitably struck down the disclaimer,
the buyer would have been left with only a new replacement part for the
faulty item precipitating the wreck and a pile of useless junk, the re-
mains of his shiny new automobile. The disclaimer as applied to those
circumstances was inequitable and against public policy. The wrath of
the Henningsen court rightly descended upon the disclaimer as "so
inimical to the public good as to compel an adjudication of its invalid-
ity." 2
0
The Henningsen decision was partially based upon Myers v. Land,
21
which the Zabriskie court also quoted. Myers v. Land was decided
(Continued from preceding page)
because of several fine print clauses which were not at issue. 2-302 offers a choice,
however, of allowing the court to delete only those clauses which it deems uncon-
scionable and enforcing the balance of the contract. See note, Unconscionable Con-
tracts Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 401 at 413 for an
expanded discussion of this case and its implications.
In spite of this hopeful admonition by the Comment, the modern trend may be
toward equitable justice in spite of contractual agreement. A leading case in this
area is Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 350 F. 2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965), where the court found that if the element of unconscionability is present
at the time a contract is made, the contract should not be enforced. Terms such
as "absence of a meaningful choice," "little bargaining power," "commercially un-
reasonable contract" are employed and give an insight into the direction of that
court.
19 Among these cases are the following: Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v.
Weber Packing Corp., 93 Utah 414, 73 P. 2d 1272 Sup. Ct. 1937), where the plain-
tiff suffered loss when defendant furnished moldy catsup; Hardy v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 38 Ga. App. 463, 144 S.E. 327 (1928), where the plaintiff's auto-
mobile had certain latent defects such as rendered it reasonably unsuited to the
use intended; Andrews Bros. v. Singer & Co., 1 K.B. 17 (1934), where the plaintiff
was "stuck" with a used car instead of the new model he ordered; Meyer v. Packard
Cleveland Motor Co., 106 Ohio St. 328, 140 N.E. 118 (Sup. Ct. 1922), where the buyer
was left with a truck which wasn't rebuilt to the standards expected, and wouldn't
do the work intended for it.
20 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, supra note 4, 161 A. 2d, at 95.
21 314 Ky. 514, 235 S.W. 2d 988 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
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equitably indicating that for every wrong there must be a right. The
decision was justifiable in that a machine failed to fulfill its intended
purpose of manufacturing concrete blocks. The theory espoused was
more than a breach of warranty. Rather, there was no delivery of that
which was bought.
But how is this applicable to Zabriskie? Modern leading cases 22 de-
cided against the validity of warranty disclaimers have been based upon
real need, where the buyer has not, for one reason or another, been made
whole as to the terms of the contract and the seller has sought refuge in
a disclaimer. Out of these decisions two vaguely distinctive areas of case
law have evolved.
The first group consists of those situations in which there is a com-
plete and usually unexpected failure of the machine to accomplish the
purpose for which it was intended. Personal injury is often claimed. The
failure invariably results in acute and obvious loss to the purchaser (a
typical example being Henningsen); and it can be a fault in original de-
sign such that the machine never works (Myers v. Land), or appear later
as in Henningsen. But loss is always obvious. 23
The second group is built on claims of improper, insufficient or inter-
mittent operation of the machine. These failures are a matter of degree
and are characterized as chronic lingering problems which often are not
solved by continuous repairs.24 Here, again, the buyer has suffered loss,
and is less than whole, although the amount of loss is usually less easy
to prove than in the first group.
Zabriskie fits neither of these categories, for the defendant has been
made whole. The plaintiff repaired the defect, and the fact that the auto-
mobile was as good as new after these repairs was uncontroverted by the
22 See Greeno v. Clark Equipment Company, 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965), in
which a defective forklift seriously injured the plaintiff; Seely v. White Motor Com-pany, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P. 2d 145 (Sup. Ct. 1965), where a truck bucked and
"galloped," the defendant repeatedly attempted without success to correct the defect
and the truck ultimately crashed; Green v. Northeast Motor Company, 166 A. 2d923 (Muni. Ct. App. D.C. 1961), and Rozen v. Chrysler Corp., 142 So. 2d 735 Fla. App.(1962) where the seller never was able to correct defects in the automobile after
repeated attempts.
23 See Greeno v. Clark Equipment Company, supra note 22; Seely v. White Motor
Company, supra note 22; Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697,377 P. 2d 897 (Sup. Ct. 1962), where a Shopsmith lathe failed and caused injury tothe plaintiff; Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 56 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969),
where the plaintiff was injured in an automobile crash resulting from defects in
throttle linkage and related parts.
24 See Green v. Northeast Motor Company, supra note 22; Rozen v. Chrysler Corp.,
supra note 22; Admiral Oasis Hotel Corp. v. Home Gas Industries, Inc., 68 ll. App.2d 297, 216 N.E. 2d 282 (1965), where an air conditioning unit never worked cor-
rectly, leaking water, etc.; Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Utley, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 51(Ky. Sup. Ct. 1969), and Sutler v. St. Clair Motors, Inc., 44 Ill. App. 2d 318, 194 N.E.2d 674, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 125 (1963), where many attempted repairs of a tractor
and of an Edsel automobile respectively were unsuccessful, and recovery was
allowed,
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defendant.25 How had the defendant been injured? He had suffered no
loss, had not changed his position to his detriment, and had been made
whole as to the basis of the bargain. The "demands of social justice" ,6
have certainly been met. Code Section 2-719 calls for "at least minimum
adequate remedies," and certainly in this case the buyer had virtually
a complete remedy. The cases contained in the Official Comment to Code
Section 2-302, as mentioned above, all remedied wrongs in which the
buyer suffered a loss and had no recourse under the contract to recover.
Such is not the case in Zabriskie, in which the court's substitution of a
new transmission by the dealer is labeled an "inadequate remedy," un-
conscionable, and against public policy, allowing Code Section 2-302 by
dicta to bar the disclaimer's remedy.
Rejection, Revocation, and Cure Under the Code
This area of the Code is one of the least understood and most often
abused or avoided;27 yet the concept is not difficult. After an elusive
point in time, acceptance takes place and rejection becomes revocation
of acceptance. The importance of this fact is more than semantical, for
the Code distinguishes the right of revocation of acceptance from that of
rejection. The seller's right to cure may also be affected.
The New Jersey Official Comments to Code Section 2-606 correctly
allude to the similarity between Code Section 2-606 and Sections 47 and
48 of the Sales Act.28 This similarity is important because it allows the
injection of pre-code case law as still valid law.29 Code Section 2-606(1)
relates to acceptance:
(a). Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer after a reasonable
opportunity to inspect the goods signifies to the seller that the goods
are conforming. 30
25 Words of the plaintiff's Post-Trial Memorandum.
26 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, supra note 4, 161 A. 2d, at 83.
27 An exception to this statement is Bartus v. Riccardi, 284 N.Y. Supp. 2d 222,
4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 845 (1967), in which a hearing aid was rejected by the buyer,
but the seller was allowed to cure. The code is knowledgeably applied by this court,
which also makes reference to excellent notes covering this subject, in 48 Cornell
L. Quarterly 13; 29 Albany Law Review 260 (1968).
28 It is interesting to note that the Official Comments to the Uniform Commercial
Code and the Uniform Commercial Code cross reference table to the Uniform Sales
Act only cross refers 2-606 to U.S.A. 48 and not U.S.A. 47. U.C.C. Sec. 2-513 is,
however, referenced to U.S.A. 47.
29 One major difference in the angle of approach is the pre-code concept of the
passing of title in dealing with sales problems. Under the Uniform Sales Act a
buyer's return of goods to a seller following passage of title to buyer would be a
rescission of the contract, not a rejection of the goods. See Alchian v. McDonald,
40 Cal. App. 505, 181 P. 77 (1919).
30 U.C.C. 1-204(1) defines reasonable time for taking any action as depending "on
the nature, purpose, and circumstances of such action."
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(b). Acceptance occurs when the buyer fails to make an effective
rejection under 2-602 (1), but such acceptance does not occur until
the buyer has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect.3
Code Section 2-513 (1) adds weight to the buyers right to inspect before
accepting even if he has previously inspected the goods:
Unless otherwise agreed . . . where goods are tendered or delivered
or identified to the contract for sale, the buyer has a right before
payment or acceptance to inspect them at any reasonable place and
time and in any reasonable manner.
Clearly under the Code a buyer is not deemed to have accepted the
goods tendered by the seller until he has had a "reasonable time" to
inspect, even though the goods are in his possession, and even though
he had a previous opportunity to inspect. This concept is given strength
because the framers of the Code deleted the emphasized portion of the
Uniform Sales Act, Section 47:
47(1). Where goods are delivered to the buyer, which he has not
previously examined, he is not deemed to have accepted them unless
and until he has had a reasonable opportunity of examining them
for the purpose of ascertaining whether they are in conformity with
the contract. (Emphasis added.)
It is implied in this language that a buyer who has examined goods
before delivery and later accepts them waives his right to rescind.3 2 He
has accepted. The Code does not contain this language or its implication
(see Code Section 2-606, 2-602, 2-513). This obviously intentional dele-
tion certainly indicates that the intent of the Code's Editorial Board was
to ease restrictions on inspection.
Assuming, then, that the buyer has the right under the Code to pos-
sess and to inspect the goods prior to acceptance, the next question must
be one of reasonable time for inspection by the buyer, and his seasonable
notification of the defect to the seller. In this area, case law decided
under Uniform Sales Act Sections 47 and 48 would apply (barring the
disparity as to previous examination), for as compared above, these pro-
visions are wholly adopted with little change by the Code as to time for
notice, etc. These sections of the Uniform Sales Act were generally inter-
preted as allowing the buyer a reasonable time within which to examine
the goods and even to allow the buyer to test the goods for a short time
to determine whether or not they conformed to the contract. 33 Many
31 Ibid.
32 Rescission is a creature of the Uniform Sales Act. It had various often vague
meanings. Here the meaning is probably best classed as "revocation of acceptance."
The goods are restored to the seller but the contract remains intact. For an ex-panded explanation and case reference on this subject, see note, 11 UCLA L. Rev. 78,
at 91 (1963).
33 Williston on Sales § 475 (rev. ed. 1948).
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cases support this assumption.
34 The New Jersey Study Commission
which authored the New Jersey Official Comments to the Code referred
to several cases which the Zabriskie court picked up as significant.
35 In
S. G. Young, Inc. v. B & C Distributors Co.,
36 the buyer held certain re-
sistors longer than a reasonable time (five months), and was held to have
waived his right to reject.
Code cases abound which support the buyer's right to inspection of
goods after possession, before acceptance.
3 7
In Zabriskie the buyer contended that a "spin around the block"
and .7 miles of driving was not a reasonable opportunity to inspect. In
light of cases noted above, in which latent defects were discovered even
months after delivery, the Zabriskie court was certainly in the main-
stream in ruling that the buyer had not exceeded his "reasonable oppor-
tunity to inspect." Also it was noted that the buyer could not have rea-
sonably discovered the latent defect until it noticeably affected the per-
formance of the machine.
3 8 The buyer had the right to inspect the goods
before acceptance, and in the Zabriskie case he had not yet accepted.
But let us return to the question of what the requisites are which
would enable a buyer to rightfully return a defective automobile.
34 See Anderson Hosiery Co. v. Dixie Knitting Mills, Inc., 204 F. 2d 503 (4 Cir. 1953),
where a latent defect was not discovered by reasonable inspection before delivery,
which was commenced as to the defective goods "a few months after March." De-
fects were not discovered until the end of June. Promptness of notification was
deemed a question for a jury, but reasonable opportunity was given the buyer to
inspect and discover defect. Also see Square Deal Mach. Co. v. Garrett Corp., 275
P. 2d 46; Storz Brewing Co. v. Brown, 47 N.W. 2d 407, 154 Neb. 204 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
An outstanding discussion is found in Reliance Varnish Co. v. Mullins Lumber Co.,
213 S.C. 84, 48 S.E. 2d 653 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
Also, the burden of proof of the unreasonableness of time of notice has been
held to be on the seller. Webster v. Klassen, 109 Cal. App. 2d 583, 241 P. 2d 302
(1952).
35 See Paul Gerli and Company v. Mistletoe Silk Mills, 80 N.J.L. 128, 76 A. 335
(1910), which offers a restatement of Uniform Sales Act Section 47; Woodward v.
Emmons, 61 N.J.L. 281, 39 A. 703 (1898), where a buyer of stonecrushers discovered
a defect, but continued to use the machines, thus waiving his right to the defense
of total lack of consideration.
36 23 N.J. Super. 15, 92 A. 2d 519 (1952). New Jersey adopted the Uniform Com-
mercial Code effective January 1, 1963.
37 Typical are: Myers v. Antone, 227 A. 2d 56 (D.C. App. 1967), where purchaser
executed a contract of sale in March and was allowed recovery upon discovering a
faulty heating system in November; Magnavox Company v. Royson, 195 Pa. Super.
139, 169 A. 2d 559 (1961), where a buyer held defective goods for possibly as long
as 22 months before returning.
38 Citing, Massari v. Accurate Bushing Co., 8 N.J. 299, 85 A. 2d 260 (Sup. Ct. 1951),
in which packaged bushings were not discovered to be defective for possibly as long
as two years. The reasonableness of this length of time was held to be a question
for the jury. This overruled any possibility of the Zabriskie defendant having
waived his rights to claim an implied warranty:
U.C.C. 2-316(3) (b): When the buyer before entering into the contract has ex-
amined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused
to examine the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which
an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him.
See the Official Comment to U.C.C. 2-316, number 8, for further explanation.
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First, let us assume the buyer had accepted the goods. Under Code
Section 2-607 (3) (a):
Where tender has been accepted the buyer must within a reasonabletime after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify
the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy.39
Reasonable time in virtually all cases of this nature has been in terms
of weeks or months.40 But in Zabriskie, possession, discovery, and notice
were almost concurrent. Certainly notice was within a reasonable enough
period to allow revocation. Under Code Section 2-608 (2) it is again
stated that the revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable
time after acceptance, but more importantly under Code Section
2-608 (1):
The buyer may revoke his acceptance at a lot or commercial unit
whose non-conformity substantially impairs its value if he has ac-
cepted it (a) without discovery of such non-conformity if his accept-
ance was reasonably induced ... by the difficulty of discovery before
acceptance (emphasis added).
This theory grew directly out of the Uniform Sales Act, in which
Section 69(1) (d) allowed the buyer to "rescind" the contract in the
case of breach of warranty, 41 and refuse the goods or return them forprice paid if already accepted. If the seller committed a material breach
of the contract, "rescission" was generally allowed in accordance with
the universal principle of contract law that the obligation on each side
is impliedly conditioned on receiving the agreed counter performance.42
Williston said that the desirability of such a remedy depends purely on
the business customs of a community and on whether it appeals to the
natural sense of justice. The remedy of rescission, if allowed at all, was
to be allowed on broad principles of justice.43 The decisions allowing
rescission did not generally make the right dependent upon the impor-
tance of the warranty or the extent of the breach of it. 4 4 Honnold 45
traces a slow retreat from "an inflexible rule of rejection." 46
39 Under U.C.C. 2-607(4) the burden of proof is on the buyer to establish anybreach with respect to the goods accepted.
40 Typically: Mahurin v. Schneck, 390 P. 2d 576 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. 1964). Buyerbought business as of Feb. 1, learned of deficiencies and notified seller to remedyon Feb. 11. The seller did not remedy. Buyer then wrote a letter of rescission Feb.18. This was held seasonable notice. Boe v. Thorburn Herseth, Inc., 134 N.W. 2d 33(N.D. Sup. Ct. 1965), held that 10 days after the purchase of a tractor was adequatetime for rescission. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F. 2d 292 (3rdCir. 1961), held that a ten month delay following the removal of the buyer's can-
cerous lung was not a bar to notice.
41 Under the Uniform Sales Act Section 69(1) (d), where there is a breach of war-ranty by the seller, the buyer may at his election "rescind the contract."
42 Vold, Handbook of the Law of Sales, 494 (1931).
43 Williston, supra note 33 at § 608.
44 Ibid.
45 Honnold, Buyer's Right of Rejection, 97 U. Pa. L. R. 457 (1948-9).
46 Id. at 97, U. Pa. L. Rev. 460.
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In the area of revocation of acceptance Code decisions bear out the
Uniform Sales Act demand for substantial or material impairment of
value to the purchaser.
However, much to Honnold's distress,47 the right of rejection under
the Code takes another tack. The Code time limit for rejection is de-
scribed as "reasonable" in Code Section 2-602 (1) (a):
Rejection of goods must be within a reasonable time after their de-
livery or tender. It is ineffective unless the buyer reasonably notifies
the seller.
48
But the right of rejection under the Code is based upon the theory of
"perfect tender," or delivery conforming to the contract in every respect
under Code Section 2-601:
Unless otherwise agreed under the sections on contractual limita-
tions of remedy (sections 2-718 and 2-719), if the goods or the tender
of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract, the buyer
may (a) reject the whole.
Immediately, the definition of "conformity" becomes basic. Under
Code Section 2-106 (2):
Goods . . . are "conforming" or conform to the contract when they
are in accordance with the obligations under the contract.
The Official Comment to Code Section 2-106 says that Code Section
2-106 (2) is intended to continue the policy of requiring exact perform-
ance by seller of his obligations as a condition to his right to require
acceptance.
So to allow revocation of acceptance, the Code demands a defect
significant enough to substantially impair the value of the goods to the
buyer. Yet, rejection is permitted upon any imperfection of tender.
There can be no question that the Zabriskie automobile did not conform
to the contract, or that the defect, however small, caused a substantial
impairment of value to the buyer. The remedies of rejection or revoca-
tion of acceptance are both open to this particular buyer.
Revocation of acceptance and rejection both indicate the right of the
buyer to return the goods to the seller, a simple concept. But is the
contractual relationship terminated, or does the seller have a right to
cure the defect and retender the goods? Generally, courts lve avoided
the issue by retaining the Uniform Sales Act concept (as it later became
interpreted) 49 of granting "rescission" for substantial breach of war-
ranty, and ignoring the Code.
47 Honnold, supra note 44.
48 U.C.C. Sec. 1-204(2) indicates that an action is taken "seasonably" when it is
taken "at or within a reasonable time."
49 Noted as "the slow retreat," Honnold, supra note 44.
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The "Buyer's Remedies in General" is the caption of Code Section
2-711:
Where . . . the buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes accept-
ance then with respect to any goods involved . . . the buyer may
cancel and ... (recover) so much of the price as has been paid.
On its face this couldn't be a more obvious statement. But a disastrous
blow would be dealt to free commerce if every buyer could reject for
the smallest flaw5" and cancel his contractual obligation under Code Sec-
tion 2-711, so the Official Comment to Code Section 2-711 qualifies the
application:
Despite the seller's breach, proper retender of delivery under the
section on cure of improper tender or replacement can effectively
preclude the buyer's remedies under this section, except for the de-
lay involved.51
Also, the Official Comment to Code Section 2-106, which demands that
goods be conforming to the contract, supports this qualification:
However, the seller is in part safeguarded against surprise as a re-
sult of sudden technicality on the buyer's part by the provisions of
Section 2-508 . . . moreover usage of trade frequently permits com-
mercial leeways in performance.
This would indicate that the framers of the Code desired perfect
tender, but also an equitable balance on the sellers side through Code
Section 2-508 and trade customs:
(1). Where any tender or delivery by the seller is rejected because
non-conforming and the time for performance has not yet expired,
the seller may seasonably notify the buyer of his intention to cure
and may then within the contract time make a conforming delivery.(2). Where the buyer rejects a non-conforming tender which the
seller had reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable with
or without money allowance the seller may if he seasonably notifies
the buyer have a further reasonable time to substitute a conforming
tender (emphasis added).
In Zabriskie, Code Section 2-508(1) is satisfied as to seasonability of
notice of intent to cure, which was simultaneous with the buyer's rejec-
tion. The retender of goods was made "within a day or so of the com-
plaint," 52 and should be considered within the contractual time for de-
livery. If it is considered to be past the contractual dead-line, Code Sec-
tion 2-508 (2) would apply. Then the question of "reasonable grounds"
arises. Did the seller reasonably believe that the automobile would be
acceptable?
50 Commonly referred to as the "perfect tender rule."
51 See U.C.C. Sec. 2-508.
52 Zabriskie Chevrolet v. Smith, supra note 5, Plaintiff's Post-Trial Memorandum.
Sept. 1969
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Plaintiff Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. is a dealer. According to the
facts, the plaintiff completed a dealer's routine checklist including seven-
ty items of preparation and inspection of the new automobile, including
a road test, which the vehicle passed. No evidence of the defect which
appeared later was found by the plaintiff or noticed by the defendant
53
until the defendant drove .7 miles at which time the faulty valve failed
to operate.
Externally, before it hindered the operation of the vehicle, the latent
defect was not detectable. Referring to the helplessness of the buyer,
the court said "to have the automobile inspected by someone with suffi-
cient expertise to disassemble the vehicle in order to discover latent de-
fects before the contract is signed, is assuredly impossible and highly
impractical." Reversing the thrust of the court, must the dealer dis-
assemble the vehicle before tender, to be "reasonably sure" that it had
not latent defects and was acceptable? Of course not.
Finally, the problem of the conformity of the retendered automobile
must be considered. The defective part was small and could be replaced
by a skilled mechanic. It was not replaced; rather, a new transmission
was substituted, possibly to save time54 or possibly because the dealer
did not have a replacement valve. The facts are not clear, but the result
is. The vehicle was "as good as new," according to the plaintiff and this
fact was uncontroverted by the defendant. The new replacement trans-
mission was a factory built unit which was new and unused, hardly of
"unknown lineage" as the court indicated. Certainly tender of this re-
paired vehicle met the contractual obligations, and should not have been
invalidated as a "cure" which endeavors by substitution to tender a
chattel not within the agreement or contemplation of the parties.
Conclusion
The disclaimer warranty may be in its death throes, but it will prob-
ably remain with us for a time. The skillful practitioner often can avoid
its confinements by finding technical flaws or applying the unconscion-
ability doctrine. But once past this hurdle, remedies must be considered;
and it is here that courts have shown little knowledge of the Code. It
would appear that few attorneys have relied upon Code Section 2-508,
2-106, 2-711, or 2-601, but this is the law. The Zabriskie case is unique
in that it contains an unusually complete examination of a disclaimer
problem in light of the Code. But, in spite of the reasoning, the decision
is dangerous if it signals any trend, because the law of perfect tender
53 Ibid.
54 A survey of a number of Cleveland's large Chevrolet dealers indicated that to
remove, tear down, rebuild, and replace a transmission of this type would take 9.5
hours by the "book," but a good mechanic could better this by an hour. Switching
transmissions as was done in Zabriskie takes about one hour.
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must be offset by the right of the seller to implement a reasonable cure.
The Code does not define "cure," and this may be a weak point. But it
is questionable if anyone could apply a uniform definition without
weighing each individual application. Here is the weakness in the
Zabriskie decision. The court demanded too precise a cure; and with
this same expectation the court stated by dicta that the buyer was in-jured and not accorded "at least adequate remedies" under Code Section
2-719. Some latitude must be allowed. This is the intent of the Code,
and anything less will foster a new breed of Llewellyn's contract-
dodgers55 and destroy the sanctity of contractual relationship.
55 "If the contract-dodger cannot be bothered, if all he needs is a rhinoceros hideto thumb his nose at his creditor with impunity, more and more men will becomecontract-dodgers 
. . . and as between individual enterprises, the competition of thecontract-dodger will drive the contract keeper into lowering his own standards ofperformance on pain of destruction." Llewellyn, What Price Contract? 40 YaleL. J. 704, n. 47 (1931).
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